One scholar has estimated that 56 nations that participated in drafting the Declaration, "North and South America, with 21 countries, represent 36% of the total; Europe with 16 countries, represented 27%; Asia with 14 countries represented 24%; Africa with four countries, a mere 6%; and Oceania, with 3 countries, represented 5%

Johannes Morsink (2010, p. 30)

20 percent of the world's people own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-third of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution with this leading to two billion of earth's people living relative affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South

Sylvia Wynter (2003, p. 260)

The average percentage of countries represented in the drafting of the declaration of human rights is found when adding the averages (36, 27, 24, 6, 5) and dividing that number (98) by five. The result is 19.6. 19.6 percent of nations participated in the drafting of the declaration of human rights. Recognizing the 19.6 percent's proximity to the 20 percent that Wynter's mentioned, we wonder about what it means when 20 percent of representation around the world drafts a declaration script for the rest of humanity. In what ways does the colonial empire-conglomerates' master narrative scripts of universal human rights agendas converge with the interest of the oppressed to benefit them as well as further cement colonial ideology? This also foreshadows the question that will no longer be shadowed: who is defining human? —which leads us to our second note.

The moral epistemology of human rights proceeds from the bottom up"

Johannes Morsink (2010, p. 36)

It seems that the epistemology (way of knowing and creating meaning) is neither a linear nor hierarchical process. It is relational. The moral epistemology of human rights has been an intentionally manufactured product —a "humanmade product" that has been packaged and marketed as universal though it is deeply entrenched in a specific context. Morsink mentions how "according to Marxist doctrine, morality is an epiphenomenal [derivative] reflection of whatever social group possesses the means of production in a given society" (Morsink, 2010, p. 34). We wonder about the ways in which the morals of human rights have indeed been a top-down approach from colonial powers, drafting from colonial worldviews. Colonialist standpoints of exploration and extraction upon the earth have socially constructed the "world" to serve the interest of the domination, while accruing unpayable debt in the forms of collective trauma. In what ways does human rights function to maintain the colonial worldviews? Though this may be the case, there still exist possibility to use and create new tools that subvert and advocate for liberation not confined to human.

The atrocities of the concentration camps elicited a moral reaction from the delegates that transcended their national and cultural backgrounds. As a result, the Declaration enumerated rights that were inherent in the human person, as such, and not culturally specific" (my emphasis)

Johannes Morsink (2010, p. 31)

As mentioned before, it seems that morals are deeply entrenched in culture. It is essential to be mindful of the context of the delegates, who represent countries at war —delegates, who's countries represent 19.6 percent of countries in the world. These contexts give rise to shared senses of morals due to an entangled history rather than a transcension of national and cultural backgrounds. These are the same background that legitimize morals to be shared similar to the repeated emphasis on "shared revulsion" (Morsink, 2010, p. 27). This intentional focus on shared to provide commonality in the drafting of the declaration of human rights makes us wonder about how common sense is indeed not common, but fabricated, which transitions us to the next note.

The Universal Declaration has universal legitimacy because it taps that rich vein that moral common sense exists —unless blocked by a corrupt and abusive state or organization —in the lives of ordinary people everywhere (my emphasis)

Johannes Morsink (2010, p. 36)

It was therefore within the terms of this new "common sense"—and in the context of his defense of the settlers' right to the lands and enserfed labor of the indigenous peoples, as well as of the Crown's right to wage just war against the latter if they resisted its sovereignty—that Sepúlveda further elaborated Mair's proposed legitimating of neo-Aristotelian by-nature difference, defining it as one based not only on differential degrees of rationality, but also being human, of humanity

Sylvia Wynter (2003, p. 299)

Morsink's use of the words "rich vein" suggest images of blood that has been given a market value based on a specific genealogy of common sense that reserves the title of "human" only to those that can be represented and not dominated. If common sense is an intentional construction to imply false sense of agreement on a set of norms as well as to legitimize exclusion of all that is not common, in which ways does framework on common sense extend to the concept of "ordinary people" as the assumed audience of the Universal Declaration? How unordinary and specific are ordinary people? Who are ordinary people juxtaposed to? Dark is seen within the dawn; however, at times, it seems that the juxtaposition is not